| Business as Unusual? Iraq has now entered a new | | | | weaker in fact. In truth, the government is simply a |
| phase of weird, wild and ferocious insurgent | | | | theatrical puppet show, a shadow court commanding |
| counter-attack. Events this month suggest a level of | | | | a phantom army over the carcass of a country. |
| tenacity, commitment and profressionalism, combined | | | | The Iraqi Army is an unreliable and contradictory |
| with fearlesness, recklessness and sometimes | | | | force. From a purely military standpoint they are |
| absurdity. But who is more recless and absurd, the | | | | almost more of a liability than a support to the US. |
| insurgents or the US. Within weeks their Sisyphean | | | | They are also poorly trained and poorly motivated. |
| policy has shown itself worthless. It is only a matter | | | | Desertion, absenteeism, apathy and unreliability is rife. |
| of time before a massive explosion takes place. | | | | In truth, most units couldn't repulse an attack by the |
| Could we see an Iraqi Intifada? How long till the US is | | | | Swiss army on bicycles. Furthermore, despite a |
| swept out? | | | | formal mix of Sunnis and Shia in the officers corps, |
| Monitoring Iraq is now like watching a weather map | | | | the rank and file are obviously overwhelmingly Shia |
| of the Mid-West in tornado season. From every, | | | | reservists. This has suited the US until know, because |
| unexpected direction all hell breaks loose with an | | | | most of their efforts have been against the Sunni |
| unpredictability and novelty that we haven't quite | | | | insurgents. But if they attempt to use the Iraqi Army |
| witnessed before. In the madness and complexity | | | | against fellow Shias and especially the Mahdi Army, |
| that is Iraq, the US surge is provoking a | | | | the Americans could quickly find the bulk would go |
| counter-surge of exceptional clashes, which are | | | | over and turn their weapons against the US. This is |
| wilder, weirder and fiercer than in the past. A serious | | | | even more so for the police, whose jobs are little |
| of unrelated, but successive events, including the | | | | more than a fresh change of clothes for the |
| intense battles for Haifa Street; the "Mission | | | | militiamen. |
| Impossible" attack on the Karbala Security Centre | | | | Worse still, are the government's own secret |
| and an attack by an armed cult on the holy city of | | | | paramilitary death squads. Established in order to |
| Al-Najaf, seems to be taking the struggle into an | | | | speed up the extermination of Sunni insurgents, the |
| extraordinary and almost eccentric stage. What might | | | | Iraqi government has trained up crack murder |
| before have had some "method in its madness," | | | | squads, like the notorious "Wolves Brigade" who act |
| appears to be giving way to a sort of "madness in its | | | | as shady, semi-official paramilitary auxiliaries for |
| method." Until now the "usual suspects, "i.e., | | | | creating ethnic cleaning, terror, murder and torture, |
| hit-and-run attacks on US forces, tit-for tat sectarian | | | | much like in Central America and Yugoslavia. The |
| killings and market bombings, while random, had, | | | | Wolves Brigade have already been accused of many |
| nevertheless, acquired a certain, strange | | | | atrocities, including killing clerics and assassinating |
| "predictability". But now the political "order" seems | | | | innocent Palestinian refugees in Iraq. Similar groups |
| more like a tank of dancing gas molecules, where | | | | called the Serpents and Scorpions are being formed |
| spontaneous combustion is the order of the day. | | | | to supplement their activities. Don't expect them to |
| Recent events have been crammed with incongruity | | | | remain loyal when matters get tough. Aligned as they |
| and paradoxes, sometimes verging on the absurd. | | | | are with the militia death squads, they will fuse with |
| The character of the insurgency has acquired starkly, | | | | them as soon as the government falls. |
| contradictory features making it seem more like | | | | Soon, the US could find itself fighting an insurgency |
| asymmetrical war in a hall of mirrors. On the one | | | | on behalf of nobody but themselves, with no elected |
| hand, there is a level of unity, professionalism, | | | | government and no army or police. In essence, the |
| discipline and commitment, not seen before. While, on | | | | Iraqi state is already just a rickety "Punch and Judy |
| the other hand, there is a risqué, recklessness | | | | Show" held up the US Army. Within weeks there |
| and bravado in their actions which sometimes has | | | | could be no state at all. America - the maddest |
| features of the downright bizarre or absurd. This all | | | | hatter of them all? |
| reflects a heightened level of social tension and | | | | "A hundred thousand men were led |
| despair, which comes not only from the impasse and | | | | By one calf near three centuries dead... |
| suffering, but a sense that this is the "last chance | | | | For thus such reverence is lent |
| saloon." There is an odour of mania in the air, and a | | | | To well-established precedent... |
| strong foreboding that something horrendous is | | | | For men are prone to go it blind |
| about to happen. | | | | Among the calf-paths of the mind, |
| This now means that all the old methods of trying to | | | | And work away from sun to sun |
| establish and maintain some form of order are | | | | To do what other men have done."Sam Walter Foss |
| redundant, and only the most novel and obscure of | | | | Moderate modes of thinking and fixed forms of |
| solutions can save the day. In such exceptional | | | | behaviour in conditions of deep chaos and disorder, |
| circumstances conservative thought is not only | | | | might appear sound judgement, but, in truth, it is so |
| inadequate, but also categorically counterproductive. | | | | incongruous and inadequate that US strategy almost |
| Likewise, solutions once considered contenders for | | | | begins to look more insane and irresponsible than that |
| national regeneration, now only lead events more | | | | of the terrorists and insurgents. In truth its |
| quickly in the direction of destruction. Given the | | | | conservative rigidity is total folly, because of its |
| contradictions inherent in the situation and the nature | | | | blatant inappropriateness and inefficacy in the face of |
| of the main players, the outlook is bleak. Only a force | | | | reality's demands. Repeating the same behaviour over |
| exterior to and independent of all the main players | | | | and over and keeping getting the same results is |
| (including and especially, the USA) could now offer a | | | | often said to be the first sign of madness. And, |
| way out. Furthermore, such an unlikely trajectory | | | | what's crazier is that the US policy makers and all of |
| must present itself quickly, because the inflammable | | | | us know that this is exactly what the US is doing - |
| material in society is so dense that an event can | | | | it's the same old failed policy being repeated over and |
| take now place, at any moment, which will catapult | | | | over again. |
| the situation beyond anyone's control and proceed in | | | | Denial always leads to repetitive, self-destructive |
| ways, and at a speed, not hitherto imagined. | | | | behaviour. But there comes a point when that denial |
| Al-Najaf: Insurgent Insanity | | | | also becomes delusional. Then we are really on the |
| If the siege of Waco proved a handful for US law | | | | road to madness. The wooden heads in Washington |
| enforcement, the US now finds itself fighting two | | | | have devised little more than a Sisyphean strategy |
| insurgent cults; Al Qaeda on the Sunni side and Jund | | | | for defeat. They push the rock up to the top of the |
| al-Samaa or the "Soldiers of Heaven" on the Shi'ite | | | | hill and it falls back down. And like Sisyphus they |
| flank. On January 28th,Iraqi forces, with US air | | | | repeat the pointless process over and over again. |
| support, faced off a huge group of fanatical, armed | | | | The problem now is; they rarely reach half-way to |
| cult members trying to storm the holy city of | | | | the top, before they have to go back down and |
| Al-Najaf, their wives and children with them. The | | | | start again. |
| attack was suicidal lunacy from a military standpoint, | | | | Faced with one of most complex counter-insurgency |
| given that Karbala was ringed with multiple, concentric | | | | situations in history, all that they can come up with is |
| bands of defences for the purpose of protecting the | | | | sending 21,000 extra troops to secure Baghdad. This |
| holiest Shi'ite site during its most important religious | | | | myopic, straight-jacketed, linear thinking by the rulers |
| pilgrimage. Nevertheless, the cult seemed to be | | | | of the world's greatest superpower beggars belief. |
| whipped up in a manic, delusional belief that they | | | | Moreover, the notion that the Iraqi Army is going to |
| could break through and massacre pilgrims and key | | | | be able take over the security of the country -within |
| Shi'ite clerics. This was part of a plan to provoke the | | | | a few months - can only be entertained by those |
| reappearance of the "Hidden Imam," a Shi'ite saint | | | | suffering from clinical delusion or practising criminal |
| from 9th century, whom they believe will establish | | | | deception. The fact is that there is no strategy and |
| justice and peace throughout the world. | | | | all tactics are accordingly limp. As Sun Tzu put it |
| To make things more complex, the group, which has | | | | "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to |
| mostly Shi'ite members, also attracts some Sunnis. | | | | victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before |
| And just to muddy the picture further, they were | | | | defeat." So marching along to noise of defeat, we |
| reported to have had support from some of the local | | | | have a President in delusion and the Pentagon winging |
| population, as well as some foreign fighters and | | | | it while "Rome burns." |
| Saddam loyalists. | | | | As the Battle for Baghdad begins in earnest, the |
| About 800 of them fought a two-day pitched battle | | | | Sunnis appear to have come out fighting daggers |
| with the Iraqi Army, which was forced to retreat and | | | | between their teeth, while for now main Shia militia, |
| call in US airpower. The group was heavily armed and | | | | the Mehdi Army has turned out to be "Robbie Burns ' |
| used anti-aircraft missiles to bring down one American | | | | famous "wee cowering, timorous beastie" This, |
| helicopter. The battle finally ceased after around 200 | | | | without doubt suits Bush and Maliki down the ground, |
| insurgents were killed, including the cults leader, | | | | but just how long it lasts is another thing. The current |
| reportedly armed with a hat and coat and two | | | | period is a time of sharp turns and sudden changes. |
| pistols. Perhaps Nietzsche was right when he | | | | And as the US has knows already "the best laid |
| observed, "in individuals, insanity is rare; but in groups, | | | | schemes of mice and men are apt to go astray." |
| parties, nations and epochs, it is the rule." | | | | . |
| Mission "Possible": Audacity and precision bordering on | | | | There has even been speculation, which looks |
| the fictitious. | | | | increasingly unlikely, that the insurgents will "fade |
| The weekend before Al-Najaf, around 30, almost | | | | away", or rather hide their arms and disengage for |
| certainly Sunni insurgents, disguised themselves and a | | | | some months. The fact that they have time on their |
| number of SUVs to look like US military brass, and, | | | | side, while the US doesn't, makes it an attractive |
| then, nonchalantly drove through 3 check points into | | | | option and would be in line with typical guerrilla tactics. |
| the secure compound of the Karbala Provincial Joint | | | | However, there are a number of factors working |
| Coordination Centre, where the US military had | | | | against this. |
| convened a meeting to discuss security for the | | | | While for guerrillas retreat under fire is not considered |
| upcoming, Ashura pilgrimage. Having entered the | | | | anything shameful, giving up hard-won control of |
| compound, the insurgents coolly picked out only | | | | whole swaths of Baghdad and the countryside is |
| American troops, killing 5 of them and leaving all Iraqi | | | | probably too hard a pill to swallow. It's not even really |
| soldiers unharmed. They then left and passed back | | | | necessary, since the US could never actually |
| through the same checkpoints unheeded. | | | | re-secure Baghdad, let alone the whole of the |
| The operation had all the audacity and planning of a | | | | country. Furthermore, it is not certain that such a |
| Western special forces undertaking, with almost | | | | tactic could be sold to the young, combative rank |
| Hollywood scale drama. But what exactly was the | | | | and file. A split or internal revolt might ensue. There |
| purpose of this expensive, high risk adventure? | | | | are already indications of this among the Shias, one |
| Propaganda value? Yes, but, perhaps more ominously, | | | | because they are being goaded into actions by |
| by kidnapping and shooting only Americans, it was a | | | | terrorist sectarian attacks from the Sunnis, who |
| form of psychological warfare, almost as if they | | | | want to spread US forces more thinly; and two |
| were making a statement, or delivering a menace | | | | because they feel humiliated standing by while the |
| telling the enemy that "we're coming to get you... | | | | Sunnis take all the "glory" in attacking the US. |
| And you have nowhere to hide!" And, moreover, | | | | Moreover by arresting a layer of the leadership and |
| "from now on you will be treated just like sectarian | | | | second-in command of the insurgents and militias, the |
| victims. Expect to be tortured and executed!" | | | | US shows it hasn't learned any of the lesson of the |
| Of course the Americans are incredulous and | | | | "Palestinian syndrome", where such actions by the |
| immediately blamed the Iraqis, pointing to | | | | Israelis have only served to enrage and embolden |
| collaboration and raising again the question of being | | | | new more radical elements. New generation of |
| able to trust them in any operations. There certainly | | | | leaders spring up in as rapid succession as they can |
| is some explaining to do and some almost | | | | be gaoled or killed. Anyhow arresting a few dozen or |
| unbelievable security blunders. Undoubtedly, insider | | | | a few hundred of their leaders won't set back their |
| information was involved, but one can't get away | | | | operations for any serious amount of time. The |
| from the sophistication and daring of a methodically | | | | Sunnis are well trained and experienced, and the Shias |
| and meticulously prepared operation, carried out so | | | | have been catching up with the aid of Iran. |
| easily against such a superior foe. Strategists can only | | | | In fact, the US has learned nothing about the lessons |
| be shocked, because it also says that if the Iraqi | | | | of counter-insurgency in Iraq or been able to learn |
| Army can't implement one single high level security | | | | from Vietnam or the experiences of the Soviets and |
| operation, and protect top brass and VIPs, what | | | | later themselves in Afghanistan. They are particularly |
| hope has it of battening down Baghdad, a city of 6 | | | | blind to lessons of the Israelis in Palestine. The most |
| million people! | | | | experienced force with regard to urban |
| The Battle for Haifa Street - A new tenacity and | | | | counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism is the USA's |
| professionalism | | | | closest ally Israel. Yet, one only has to look at their |
| This month's battle for Haifa Street was the first | | | | record and the intensity of their efforts to see how |
| inkling of a new Sunni strategy in the face of the | | | | everything has been in vain. The Occupied Territories |
| anticipated US offensive. From the 4th to the 12th of | | | | of West Bank and Gaza, seized in 1967, have a |
| January, for up to 12 hours a day for almost a week | | | | combined population of 4 million. The insurgency |
| around 1,000 US and Iraqi troops were fought to | | | | began proper with the second intifada beginning in |
| standstill by 100 or so Sunni insurgents in a fire fight | | | | 2000. It has been entirely urban combat. In the |
| of a character and intensity not normally witnessed | | | | course of it, the Israeli forces have killed some 4,000 |
| before. | | | | Palestinians and wounded more than 20,000. Another |
| Unlike most previous insurgent attacks, which are | | | | 28,000 insurgents have been arrested and 8,000 |
| characterized by hit and run tactics, opportunistic | | | | Palestinians remain in prison. The scale of the loss of |
| sniper fire or roadside bombs, this was a | | | | innocent lives, destruction of homes and |
| sophisticated, well-commanded and coordinated | | | | infrastructure is well known. But despite the colossal |
| assault by up to a dozen different Sunni insurgent | | | | repression, the insurgency shows no sign of stopping |
| groups, collaborating together. It was evidently a | | | | 6 years on. Were the Americans to employ the |
| well-planned and implemented operation with the | | | | same intensity of counter insurgency in Iraq, it would |
| express intention of engaging large scale US and Iraqi | | | | mean having to arrest about 190,000 insurgents and |
| forces in persistent, relentless and tenacious, | | | | to kill or wound another 140,000. |
| close-quarter, urban combat. | | | | Furthermore, the US forces have lost at an incredible |
| Militarily, the battle at Haifa Street was important | | | | rate of some 3,000 dead and 20,000 wounded in 3 |
| from a number of standpoints. Firstly, the combined | | | | years, compared to an average of 500 Israelis in the |
| efforts of US and Iraqi forces were unable to defeat | | | | same period. Even if one takes into account |
| the insurgents. The 500 US troops engaged there | | | | differences in size of population, Americans are still |
| could neither contain nor crush what were probably | | | | dying at insurgent hands at something like 6 times |
| at most 100 insurgents. Moreover, the weakness of | | | | the rate of Israeli troops under fire. |
| the Iraqi forces and the big doubt over whether they | | | | "Best policy in war - thwart the enemy's strategy, |
| could hold onto areas after the US withdraws was | | | | second best - disrupt his alliances through diplomacy, |
| exposed. There were some 400 Iraqi Army involved | | | | third best - attack his army in the field, worst |
| and, if they had faced the attack on their own would | | | | strategy - attack walled cities." |
| have been routed. The 500 US troops were fought | | | | "The Art of War," Sun Tsu |
| to a standstill, even though they enjoyed the | | | | If the example of Palestine were not enough, then |
| advantage of air support in the form of repeated | | | | the ignominious and humiliating defeat for Israel in |
| assaults by apache attack helicopters and even F-15 | | | | Lebanon should serve as a fresh reminder of what |
| jet fighters, which proved worthless in dislodging the | | | | can happen when the an inferior military force like |
| determined insurgents. | | | | Hezbollah has the balance of moral and psychological |
| A key factor in the Sunni success was their high | | | | forces weighted decisively in its favour. Israel went |
| mobility and command and coordination. They | | | | on to choose Sun Tsu's two worst options and paid |
| changed positions swiftly and often in small numbers | | | | a heavy price. |
| of only two or three men, melting away and then | | | | Indeed, today In Iraq, the situation is much worse |
| remerging in different positions. Indeed, during the | | | | than Lebanon, Palestine and even anything Sun Tsu |
| battle, US troops were not just fighting across one | | | | could have envisaged. This is because Iraq is largely |
| side of the street to the other, but they were taking | | | | an urban country and the modern city is a beehive of |
| fire from all different directions at once, and were | | | | walled cities within walled cities. Every street, every |
| frequently forced to run for their lives, abandoning | | | | high rise block or administrative centre becomes a |
| building after building. | | | | smaller walled city which can be defended and has to |
| What made Haifa different was from a military | | | | be taken. Besieging walled cities is withering. It wears |
| standpoint that was the insurgents were more than | | | | down the nervous system of the attacker five times |
| able to fight the American over a long period in a | | | | more than it does the defender. Moreover, it |
| more classical-style war conflict situation. The Sunni | | | | polarizes attitudes into a sense of futility for the |
| were commanded and co-ordinated in highly | | | | aggressor and sense of determination and |
| professional way and acted with discipline and a high | | | | doggedness for the defender. Amongst the assailed |
| degree of flexibility. They furthermore applied novel | | | | civilian population there is a mental and social closing |
| tactics that were used to great effect and which the | | | | of ranks as the most basic, the fundamental and last |
| US troops were unable to respond to. At times the | | | | line of defence, the home, the symbol of security |
| guerrillas ran rings around helpless US units and looked | | | | and family, is assaulted. |
| near to inflicting a defeat on them, despite having a | | | | Fighting in such proximity to this especially in modern |
| manpower deficit of some 4 or 5 to 1 in the US | | | | warfare and the growth of animosity and contempt |
| favour and one to ten if one bothers to count the | | | | for the aggressor is draining on the spirit and |
| Iraqi Army. | | | | purposefulness of the troops. In fact, it is this, and |
| The poor US performance must increase | | | | not the physical tours of duty, which is bringing the |
| reservations about their ability to clear Baghdad of | | | | US Army to "breaking point," as their Generals have |
| militias and insurgents. At the same time, in the week | | | | warned. The current strategy and tactics of the US |
| long battle, Iraqi forces showed more evidence of | | | | is toward a pointless and worthless end goal. There |
| their inability and unreadiness to take on insurgents, | | | | isn't the chance in hell of a "win-win" or even a |
| casting further doubt on their potential for success in | | | | "win-lose" outcome. There is nothing but "lose-lose" |
| both the first wave and then in the critical second | | | | for the Americans and their soldiers know it. The |
| phase of coming operations, when they are | | | | situation for the Americans is an enigma of war. |
| expected to of hold onto areas liberated by US | | | | Formerly, they occupy the city, yet they have not |
| troops. While the US and Iraqi forces appeared | | | | conquered it. They patrol the streets, but cannot the |
| uncoordinated and lacking in trust, the new | | | | scale the "walls." The Americans are an elephant with |
| phenomenon for the insurgents was the collaboration | | | | chicken's legs. They cannot run and they cannot |
| in combat of around 12 different insurgent troops, | | | | standstill. |
| prepared to subjugate themselves to a common | | | | Sadr City & the Mehdi Army - the double-walled |
| command. Finally, there appeared to be a definite | | | | city. |
| deficit in levels of morale between the two battling | | | | Despite the effective demobilisation of the Mehdi |
| sides - the insurgents coming out on top, while the | | | | Army, the Americans may totally misread the |
| US, and, especially the Iraqis not showing the same | | | | dynamics and sensitivities of the situation. Despite |
| level of tenacity and audacity shown by their | | | | frequent bombing by Sunnis, Sadr City is a relative |
| opponents. | | | | haven for the 2 million Shias living there under the |
| Assault n°2 "Operation Boomerang Twice" | | | | protection of the Mehdi Army. The population will |
| So following a 10 day pause to lick their wounds and | | | | view a US assault as an attempt to strip them of |
| reassess their tactics, the US declared they had | | | | their last defences against the ravages of the |
| learned their lessons from the first encounter and | | | | anarchy in Baghdad. Should the US invade to mop up |
| were ready to retake the thoroughfare. On the 24th | | | | rouge elements of the Mehdi, it is possible that the |
| of January they launched a second offensive or | | | | local population might throw their weight behind the |
| rather a third. Because it comes to light now that, in | | | | "stray" militiamen, in order to defend to the death |
| fact, after intense fighting, they had already "cleared" | | | | what has become almost their own "statelet." If |
| Haifa Street of insurgents in 2004 and handed it over | | | | Muqtada al-Sadr still refuses to lead, he would be |
| to the Iraqis. Unfortunately, that doesn't seem to | | | | discredited and his rank and file could split away to |
| have worked out. Evidently the insurgents had taken | | | | form another militia, which could quickly mushroom |
| back full control and the Iraqi Army has fled the area. | | | | under such conditions. |
| Things, obviously, weren't going to be the same this | | | | A major battle for the Sadr City would become a |
| time, or were they? | | | | cause célèbre for the whole "Shia nation." |
| On Wednesday morning the day erupted to the | | | | Shia public opinion around the whole of the country |
| thunder of heavy artillery and a huge display of aerial | | | | and internationally would rally to support their |
| firepower. In scenes more reminiscent of the Russian | | | | brethren under American attack. This could see a |
| obliteration of Grozny, the US mercilessly pounded | | | | closing of ranks, wherein the various competing Shia |
| apartments and other high-rise buildings from air and | | | | militias would merge or form fighting alliances |
| ground. What was called "Operation Tomahawk | | | | together to focus on striking US forces throughout |
| Strike 11 was in full swing. Heavy gunfire, sniper | | | | Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. |
| bullets and mortars and RPG rockets met them. The | | | | Sadr city could be the "surge into the abyss" for the |
| fighting lasted from dawn to dusk for some three | | | | US. Parallels would be drawn with the battle for the |
| days. Civilian casualties were much higher than before, | | | | Warsaw ghetto or the Russian assault on Grozny. |
| some 37 on one day alone, including women and | | | | The only way that they could hope to "win" would |
| children, prompting a cry of "genocide" from the | | | | be pursue a scorched earth policy. It will spell the end |
| Muslim Scholars Association. Film crews were | | | | for Maliki. The government will fall and Al-Hakim's |
| embedded from CNN and heavy media coverage | | | | support will diminish along with support from his Badr |
| was invited in, obviously in anticipation of a victory | | | | Corps, who will be drawn to side with the Mehdi |
| this time round. However, when two days coverage | | | | Army. At the same time the Sunni insurgents would |
| had evaporated and evidently "Operation Tomahawk | | | | take advantage of the overstretched US forces to |
| 11" had become "Operation Boomerang Twice" the | | | | face them down in other areas of Baghdad and Al |
| media silently slunk away. | | | | Anbar province. |
| Yet again the Iraqi Army performed miserably. Even | | | | Despite US and British hopes, the new offensive will |
| on camera it was evident by the half-hearted way | | | | not be contained to Baghdad and Al Anbar. As the |
| they shot from the hip that they had no stomach for | | | | US tries to take control of areas of the capital city, |
| the battle or firing on their fellow countrymen. One | | | | whole provinces, some previously calm, will be |
| of them interviewed on camera rather sheepishly | | | | liberated or will descend into both war and civil war. It |
| pleaded that they lacked the US weapons to take | | | | will spread throughout the country. US forces will be |
| control and hold the area on their own, a clear | | | | totally overstretched. Mosul and other cities will |
| admission of the futility of the whole US strategy. | | | | explode. Kirkuk will become a sectarian killing field. |
| Whether the fighting in the two other districts and an | | | | There will be a "Baghdadisation" of the whole of Iraq. |
| attack on a Multi-National Divisional Patrol were | | | | In the south, especially in Basra, the idea that British |
| started intentionally by Sunnis in order to overstretch | | | | troops can somehow quietly hand over power to the |
| US forces is not clear. One area was the scene of | | | | Iraqi Army and begin packing their bags or retreat to |
| the downing of the private security helicopter a few | | | | safe barracks, while at the same time Bush pursues |
| days before and could have been part of a US | | | | his offensive in Baghdad, will be exposed as another |
| revenge mission or extended operations. | | | | example of Alliance myopia. Existing Shia militia |
| What was clear was that Haifa was indented as a | | | | in-fighting in the south may initially intensify at first, |
| model operation as part of the new offensive - "a | | | | but groups will be forced to vie with one another in |
| series" according to officials, "of target raids to | | | | the ferocity of their assaults on the British forces. |
| disrupt illegal militia activity and help restore Iraqis | | | | The intensification of the whole situation will likely |
| security force control in the area." But despite the | | | | result in the local Iraqi Armed Forces and police |
| massive numbers, 1,000 or more US and Iraqi troops, | | | | publicly dissolving into respective militias. Given the |
| with massive heavy weapons and aerial back up, | | | | wave of hatred towards the United States which will |
| they failed again to dislodge or seriously impede the | | | | sweep the country, it is fantasy to imagine that the |
| insurgents. | | | | troops of its principal ally will be allowed to simply sit |
| The insurgents are clearly much better prepared and | | | | comfortably in their canteens. In the second city of |
| ready to take casualties. However, the damage | | | | Basra and across the Shia south of the country, they |
| inflicted was minor even according to the official | | | | will become the key focus for revenge on the |
| communiqués that some 30 militants were killed | | | | foreign occupiers. Rather than beginning their peaceful |
| and 35 detained. A small number for such a massive | | | | withdrawal from Iraq, the small British force of 7,000 |
| investment. Although they had supposedly "learned | | | | troops is more likely to driven out and/or slaughtered. |
| the lessons of earlier" in the month the Americans | | | | An Iraqi Intifada on the menu or pie in the sky? The |
| yet again showed the futility of this form of | | | | recent assault on Al-Najaf is in a way a distorted |
| traditional warfare against asymmetrical forms. | | | | expression of a desire among section of the Iraqi |
| The effectiveness of the Sunni defence and the | | | | people for unity in battle. Reports of support from |
| spread of fighting to the two other Sunni districts of | | | | local people confirm that despite its perversion |
| Al Fadl and Adhamiya, could now mark a shift away | | | | through the prism of this cult, there are still |
| from an insurgency based mostly on psuedo or | | | | substantial reservoirs of unity, which are heavily |
| adapted peasant guerrilla warfare, to a more | | | | suppressed by the current pervasive sectarianism. |
| sophisticated form of urban guerillarism, also | | | | These are reservoirs which neither the Maliki |
| incorporating, but not relying on elements of classical | | | | government or the US can tap from above. They |
| warfare. The combination of the flexibility and agility | | | | can only develop from below, but it may well be |
| of terrorist and guerrilla tactics with classical methods | | | | triggered by some atrocity or massacre on the part |
| of warfare could prove a formidable mix, which | | | | of Americans. |
| would leave US forces totally confused and | | | | An intensified offensive is pregnant with |
| wrong-footed. | | | | unforeseeable inflammatory "incidents." Almost |
| Had the US and Iraqi forces wanted a better | | | | certainly, American troops will engage in massacres |
| simulation exercise they could have asked for it. | | | | and atrocities at some point, with far-reaching |
| However, if this is a harbinger of things to come, the | | | | consequences. When morale begins to break down, |
| ability of the insurgents to intensify and diversify | | | | so too do morals. The abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, |
| tactics means that the outcome doesn't bode well | | | | the atrocities carried out in Fallujah, Haditha and |
| for the real thing. They could well be facing a much | | | | Mahmoudiya are only the tip of the iceberg of what |
| more humiliating and devastating defeat than the first | | | | is already going on and mere blips on the radar |
| time they tried to secure Baghdad. One has to say | | | | screen of what is to come as the battle gets more |
| that after employing such numbers and force for just | | | | brutal. In what will be considered by both sides as a |
| one area, what hope do they have of clearing and | | | | fight to the last, with US troops engaged in the most |
| holding a city of 6 million? | | | | intense urban warfare ever, it is inevitable that US |
| The intensification of sectarian atrocities, combined | | | | troops will cause large scale collateral damage at |
| with a number of unusually belligerent and audacious | | | | some point. |
| attacks on US forces, appears to suggest, that | | | | In these circumstances, outrage among both sides of |
| these are not just a response to the hanging of | | | | the community could fuel the fire of the war in Iraq |
| Saddam Hussein, but a decision to meet the new US | | | | to frenzied levels. A spiral of clashes could occur. |
| troops head on, fire with fire! But the character of | | | | Even instances of joint Sunni/Shia actions, rising up |
| the attacks is new, in that there is not only a highly | | | | from among the masses, could not be ruled out, |
| effective military professionalism involved, but also a | | | | when anger against the Americans reaches boiling |
| new level of ferocious determination, daring and | | | | point. In today's Iraq it would mean the appearance |
| bravado, almost to the point of wild recklessness and | | | | of tens of thousands of armed protesters. It should |
| suicidal inhibition.A Dance of Death | | | | be not be forgotten that many streets have their |
| This is the "last chance saloon" -mentality. There is | | | | own volunteer defence forces and that almost every |
| not going to be another "Battle for Baghdad," - this is | | | | man in the country is armed with rifles and small arms |
| the one and only final one. The Americans know it, | | | | for his own and his family's self-defence. These same |
| the government knows it, the insurgents and militias | | | | weapons could be quite easily turned on the |
| know it, and the people know it too. What each of | | | | Americans by outraged mobs demanding their |
| them also knows is that it is not going to succeed in | | | | immediate withdrawal. US troops could be caught in a |
| any of its objectives. Beneath the surface everyone | | | | position of mowing down hundreds of civilians |
| already knows what the outcome will be and few | | | | threatening to overwhelm them. If such things come |
| wish to face it. Nobody wants the US to win, but | | | | about, then, for the first time, serious demands could |
| everybody knows Armageddon follows, should they | | | | be made to indict US generals and officers for war |
| likely loose. | | | | crimes in front of international tribunals. |
| The battle is starting to be played out like some | | | | Should the current Iraqi insurgency become a |
| macabre tribal "Dance of Death" with the principal | | | | full-blown uprising or intifada, it would be even more |
| actors adopting incongruous poses and exaggerated | | | | ferocious and deadly than in the Occupied Territories. |
| expressions, and grasping every opportunities to act | | | | It would quickly become a mass, armed uprising |
| out in public their most carnal and lurid fantasies. The | | | | involving hundreds of thousands, if not millions on the |
| dance is only the prelude to the bestiality, which is | | | | streets. Numbers of US casualties would explode |
| about to follow. Each actor is fighting to secure the | | | | geometrically. Thousands of troops could loose their |
| best position from which to face the implosion and | | | | lives within hours. US TV screens may soon be |
| anarchy, which will make the current chaos look like | | | | carrying pictures of helpless units trapped under fire, |
| harmony. | | | | with soldiers being dragged from burning buildings and |
| The Dance of Death, which is the "Battle for | | | | smouldering humvies and then being torn apart by |
| Baghdad," finds all the actors in a ring holding hands | | | | crazed mobs. The spectre of beheaded American |
| and circling the verge of the great abyss that is their | | | | corpses lining the Baghdad thoroughfares and US |
| collective destiny. In true Nietzschean style, all of | | | | troops swinging from the lampposts is not out of the |
| them are gazing into this abyss and it is gazing back | | | | question. As the battle intensifies outside powers will |
| into them. Not one contender has a real future. | | | | supply the insurgents with anti-aircraft weaponry and |
| Whatever the outcome the Americans have lost, and | | | | other more sophisticated arms. The sight of |
| even it turn out to be a tactical success, the | | | | "Black-Hawk-downs" falling from the sky is already |
| insurgents and their communities know that would | | | | almost becoming commonplace. Sooner rather than |
| only delay the rivers of blood. They remained | | | | latter, the US Army would have no option but to flee |
| wrapped in a duet of mutual annihilation, which cannot | | | | the country. |
| be avoided by any measures on the part of the | | | | Ironically, just at the time that the Palestinians appear |
| Americans. This a dance of death, there is no other | | | | to be descending in factional civil war, an "Iraqi |
| outcome. | | | | Intifada" is now the country's only hope of holding |
| The Papier-mâché Government & | | | | the nation together. Despite, the seemed impossibility |
| Army | | | | of it, in paradoxical situations like this the rules of |
| The governing exiles like Maliki are total novices when | | | | formal logic are often stood on their heads. Against all |
| it comes to power politics. They are in way over | | | | current expectations, should a popular uprising begin - |
| their heads, they have no feel for the situation, no | | | | especially as a result of an American atrocity and |
| touch for the masses or finesse in anticipating and | | | | regardless of whatever section of the population |
| handling delicate and explosive issues. They lack any | | | | starts it - a real uprising would have an incredible |
| foresight as to the real situation and especially with | | | | power of attraction across the sectarian divide. The |
| regards to the consequences of their own actions. | | | | population would sense an astonishing force of |
| They are little more than narcissistic novices led by | | | | empowerment as it suddenly becomes aware that, |
| greed for personal power, prestige and the plundering | | | | united, it represents an irresistible force, which its |
| of the state purses and lucrative kickbacks. They | | | | oppressor simply could have no hope of withstanding. |
| lack any moral ballast or integrity. In many ways they | | | | Moreover, such a movement would tend to also |
| resemble the mafia business bosses of the new | | | | sweep over the heads of the existing sectarian and |
| Russian capitalism, except they are much less | | | | insurgents and militia leaders. New leaders could be |
| successful. In brief, the majority of Iraqi government | | | | thrown up from among the people and a new |
| ministers are inexperienced, irresponsible, myopic and | | | | popular, non-sectarian government could even be |
| thoroughly egotistic. Worse still, they show a | | | | swept into power. This would be a real "surge" and it |
| sectarian mentality verging on humanitarian criminality. | | | | would traverse the country like a tidal wave. Its ripple |
| Maliki and others, like the cleric Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim, | | | | effects would be felt across the Middle East, where |
| appear to be hoping that the US will still continue to | | | | pan-Arab, nationalist, anti-American feelings could |
| strike mostly at the Sunnis and also weaken Muqtada | | | | even engulf the present rise of fundamentalism. |
| al-Sadr sufficiently to secure their government's | | | | However, the trouble with all unusual movements of |
| future. They hope that by the end of the operation | | | | the sea is that it depends on many factors in the |
| in the summer, when US troops will withdraw to | | | | environment converging at once, for it to come |
| barracks, the Iraqi Army can be systematically taken | | | | about. Unless it firmly changes the shoreline, such a |
| over by their own militias and will provide a force | | | | popular surge can be dissipated into many different |
| strong enough to concretise a Shia-led state. | | | | channels and the old patterns will remerge. |
| Al-Hakim is now going one-step further and hedging | | | | Concretising such a movement in the face of so |
| his bets, in case the US cannot destroy the Sunni | | | | many complex forces and challenges would |
| insurgency and Al Qaeda in Anbar province, by calling | | | | extremely difficult, but not totally impossible. |
| for a thinly veiled three-state-solution in the cloaked | | | | Today everything is in flux. The vortex is beginning |
| form of "federal regions." | | | | to spin. The situation is becoming even more wild and |
| But one shouldn't underestimate their capacities for | | | | unpredictable. All that is certain in the specifics of |
| optimistic and imagination. While they espouse plans | | | | development are the general facts, which are; the US |
| for the future, it is not at all sure they will last out in | | | | is doomed to come out of this emasculated as a |
| office till the Spring, let alone summer. Indeed, only | | | | great power. In other words it too will lose a great |
| days before Maliki was demagogically committing | | | | part of its former identity. Iraq, for its part, will either |
| himself to the iron fist of militia disbandment, he was | | | | be gripped by a unifying, popular, revolutionary |
| publicly talking of resigning! In reality, it will take only | | | | uprising, which will build a new identity out of the |
| one major mishap for Maliki to jump ship. It will not | | | | positive parts of the old; or like the dreadful sight of |
| be long before the Iraqi government collapses in the | | | | a psyche broken to pieces by trauma, it will tear its |
| coming situation. In reality, it has long ago lost any | | | | own Self apart from inside out and, finally, cease to |
| public legitimacy. Even amongst the Shias it support is | | | | be a part of reality. |
| wafer thin. Their positions and future are no more | | | | Stephen J. |
| secure than the general situation and somewhat | | | | |